

Christopher Francis Patten:

Madam Sabanci, Strobe, ladies and gentlemen, first of all can I say what a great honor it is to be invited to deliver a lecture that bears the name of such a distinguished benefactor of such a distinguished foundation and of such a distinguished university. He came, he saw, he conquered, even enjoying a standing ovation from the European press corps in London. President Obama's first official trip to Europe in March was a huge success, a source of pleasure for all Americaphiles. This did not perhaps come as a surprise, after all Barack Obama was overwhelmingly the choice of the admittedly non-voting European public for the White House. You follow a president whose departure is not widely lamented in either old or new Europe. Moreover, not to downplay his triumph, he does not face stiff competition in terms of charisma or authority when stood on side his European peers. He speaks as the newly elected leader of what is still the world's only super-power. Which of his partners speaks for Europe and were any of them to do so, what would they have to say and would their colleagues agree with them? Now here I confess to a typical European presumption. By Europe I mean the European Union, even though not every country in the continent of Europe is a member of EU. But most countries are already members or would like to be so in the future. President's last port of call was Turkey, the fate of whose application for membership will help to define Europe's future as well as their country's own destiny. The largest non-members are the part-aspirant Ukraine, whose fluctuating Western border tells much of the story of Europe over two centuries, and Russia which is only partly European, culturally, politically and geographically. I hope that my compression is defensible. When therefore I suggest that the President conquered Europe, what exactly was it that he conquered? What is Europe today? The European Union is a process, a process which has enabled European nation states to cope with their past and to accommodate themselves to a world in which individually they are no longer great powers, reactive and visionary. Reactive because it came into existence to entomb ethnic nationalism which had hatched the Holocaust and triggered two world wars. Visionary, because it offered at its most radical the notion of a super-state rising from the ashes of the nation states left behind by empire. And it is most practical the still pretty revolutionary notion of nation states sharing sovereignty in defined areas and accepting binding dispute settlement machinery to make that pooling of sovereignty work. The creature that has emerged bears the strong imprint of the second, to some people lesser, vision. Then there are still occasional flashes of the first, the sight of a flag or the sound of Beethoven's Ode to Joy. When President Giscard d'Estaing presented the work of his European Convention, which had been set the task of drawing the legal treaty-based threads that bound the EU together into a constitution for the 21st century, he argued that this was akin to the work of the founding fathers of the United States in Philadelphia. This claim was confusing braggadocio. In Philadelphia sub-national entities agreed to form themselves into a nation state, albeit one whose institutional manifestations spent many years learning to cohere. In Brussels, proud and in many cases ancient, nation states were agreeing which of their powers they were prepared to share with others and the terms on which they were ready to do this. They were not winding themselves up like bankrupt companies. The American constitution begins with the words "we the people", the EU Treaty, which still awaits ratification, begins with the words "His Majesty the King of the Belgians" and goes on to list in alphabetical order the heads of state in all the other EU countries. We the people of Europe are not the source of legitimacy and accountability. We the people of such and such country validate the EU and provide its authority. There is, as it has been widely noted, no European demos, no European electorate. There is a European Parliament which has power but not much authority. Europeans are not greatly interested in the politics of one another's countries. Their televisions, on the other hand, keep them well-informed about football across the continent. The beautiful game pulls them together much more than the political parties of the left, right and center could ever do. Moreover, the exclusion of

most of the political issues that most concern them from Europe's collective agenda ensures that the questions that dominate European debate are invariably of secondary importance to voters. Member states will not give up to Brussels their tax raising powers or their responsibility for health, education, pensions or labor markets. And no government is going to cede to others the right to determine, whether its young men and women should take out arms risking life and limb. So Europe is not the creation of a federalist's dreams on the one hand, or of a Europhobe's nightmares on the other. It's alleged pretensions to super-statehood are what Saint Thomas Moore called 'terrors for children'. In Europe national sovereignty is transformed, it is not thrown away or usurped. None of this belittles the real and extraordinary achievements of Europe, far surpassing any previous efforts anywhere at sustained regional cooperation. The EU has drawn together a collection of different national economies into a trans-national single market. The IMF reported in April 2007 that this market's GDP was significantly bigger than that of the United States. 15.8 trillion pounds versus 11.6 trillion pounds. Europe invests more in America than America does in Europe. This single market is represented internationally by a single trade negotiator, albeit one with a mandate agreed by national capitals. In trade policy the EU is the biggest global hitter alongside the US. Not a claim that could be made in the foreign and security fields. 12 of the members states operate with a single currency and monetary policy. The EU has a harmonized environmental policy. The single market is not complete, not fully covering yet energy policy or services, but the scale of the advance has been sufficient to make the European Commission for example one of the most significant global actors in competition policy. It is easy to see why the EU is regarded as an economic giant on the world's stage. It aspires, of course, to be much more, but in foreign and security policy, rhetoric is too often being stranded, way ahead of the political will, to turn heavy aspiration into facts on the ground. The end of the cold war impelled Europe along the road in the hunt for a political role that would match its economic one. No longer with a commercial Charles Atlas (10.22)..... to be kicked in his political face. There were several reasons for this. With the crumbling of the Berlin wall Western Europe lost its geo-strategic centrality and the importance it enjoyed merely by surviving and prospering under American nuclear umbrella. Perhaps Europeans recalled the glory days when their flags had fluttered over palm and pine. They certainly remembered that America's role in Europe's reconstruction had aimed at the creation of a democratic partner capable of assisting the US in bearing the burdens of global leadership. In addition, the Russian Empire's dismemberment raised questions of stability on Europe's own continent. It had in the recent past taken in Spain, Portugal and Greece to consolidate their democratic escape from military dictatorship and fascism. Now it had to look to its responsibilities in the East. On top of that, in Yugoslavia, the collapse of the state before the ferocious recrudescence of ethnic nationalism brought back to Europe those demons that we believed had been exorcised almost 50 years before. Over 220.000 people died, concentration camps were established, families were burnt from their homes, ethnic cleansing destroyed communities, war crimes stalked Europe, not just Ruanda. And all this within a short drive from the beaches where Europeans had only recently baked themselves in the Dalmatian sun. And what did Europe do? We had meetings, we drafted communiqués, replete with strong nouns and weak verbs and we bragged that the hour of Europe had at last arrived. But Europe would not decide what it wanted. Did it want to stop Yugoslavia from falling apart, to expedite the process or to look the other way? What America declined to do mattered far more than what Europe could agree to do. Surely nothing has done more to push Europe into the ambition to play a role in foreign and security policy than the bloody humiliations of the Balkans. There was a humdrum prosaic point to consider as well. While two European countries had nuclear weapons and were also permanent members of the UN Security Council, because they had come to demand as second world war's victors, no European country on its own could shake the world's affairs. Even if despite the bruising lesson of Suez, some were prepared to deny that, they would surely conceive that they

mattered more around the world could pack a bigger punch when they spoke or acted together. So how did they actually wish to behave as a partner of their friend and protector, the US? There was a conceptual problem here, an issue that divided the member states. Should Europe focus primarily on building a European pillar for the transatlantic arch, or on constructing the arch itself? As with many metaphors, the symbols often take over the argument and confound objective analysis. But there was certainly a difference of opinion with Britain and France on different sides of the architectural argument and Germany somewhere in the middle. Since the 1940s, Britain had seen itself primarily as an American confidante who happened, also latterly, to be a member of the EU. British Prime Minister sought to play the ever faithful Jeeves in the White House, a discreet clearing of the throat, pursuant to a courtly word to the wise. Is there anything these days more demeaning than London's periodic attempts to squeeze the phrase "special relationship" out of American administrations? Often the result of all this is bad for Britain and unhelpful for America, as was the case when Mr. Blair played the Old Testament's Ruth to your last President in Iraq. Intreat me not to leave thee or to return from following after thee, for whither thou goest, I will go and where thou lodgest, I will lodge. Thus Mr. Blair. In France, your oldest ally, attitudes had been a little more confusing. Bedeviled by an exceptionalism that mirrors that same American quality that we love in Europe to hate, Harold McMillan said of General De Gaulle, he speaks of Europe but he means France. France certainly associates the worst of globalization with the US, even while enthusiastically swallowing your McDonalds and I never quite been able to fathom whether French criticism of America is because you have done so much for Europe or because you haven't done more. I dwell on the two countries that I know best and love most for a simple reason. This is not a very communautaire point, yet there is no European policy to speak of where France and Britain and Germany too are not at heart of the action. I don't seek to be rude about the others or to belittle them, but count out the big three and nothing much gets done. And Britain has to recognize that because of our history of semi-detached engagement, sometimes all that matters is for France and Germany to arrive at the table. The nature of any European partnership with the US, is imbued with the lessons that you taught some of us after the II World War. There has to be an international rule book to which all are subject, supported by international institutions that help to give it legitimacy. We want to work with you as partners to deal with common problems that no one state can tackle successfully on its own. It was the sense that that appeal of the world had been cast away with derision by the Bush administration that caused such wailing and gnashing of teeth in Europe. Now we sense that normal services have been resumed with a charmed dash and eloquence that captivate us. With President Bush we knew what we were against. But do we now know exactly what we are for or rather what we are prepared to do to sustain a view of the world that we regard as fundamentally European? There are a few problems. When we define Europe's multi-lateralism is there a danger that, as Gertrude Stein said of Oakland "there is no there, there"? For a start, what happens when international rules, the international rule of law are defied? When is Europe happy to concede the use of force? After 9/11 Europe drafted and agreed with commendable speed a global strategy paper. One reason why we were able to agree it so quickly is that this was a question that we (18.46)..... When Robert Kegan compared Europe with Venus and America with Mars, there was rather more truth to the observation than was comfortable for Europeans. The reasons for our Venusian tendencies are clear. We tried Mars to destruction in the last century. We are addicted of course to endless meetings because we know that they are better than shooting at one another. Diplomacy is not the wimp's way out. As W. H. Auden noted of diplomats, "and on the issue their charm depended . A land laid waste and all its young men slain". Naturally many Europeans are prepared to fight, to put their lives on the line for a good international cause. We have contributed substantially to conflict prevention and to peace keeping from the Balkans to the Middle East, to Africa, to Afghanistan. But if public spending is a mark of a nation state's priorities, then the amount

that many member states spend on their defense forces does not suggest that the ability to deploy military capability ranks as high as European rhetoric would suggest it should. We are unlikely in Europe to become much more than a super civilian power unless we spend more on defense, harmonize defense procurement and lose our nervousness about using the force that we actually have. European defence budgets shrink. Germany spends for example only 1.5 % of GDP on its military and 2/3 of this budget goes on to personnel, including 130.000 civilian employees. My grandfather's and my father's generations wanted the Germans to spend less on their armed forces. Today we want them to spend more. Without doubt this is a preferable situation, but it does have consequences, as we can see in Afghanistan. It also inevitably raises questions about the role of NATO, questions that seem to me to be posed as well by the debate about Georgia and NATO enlargement that was triggered by Russia's squalid military action in South Ossetia. Some seem to talk about NATO enlargement as though in discussing membership of a tennis club. It's a military alliance the commitments to which are serious matters of life and death. What is NATO's function today? Where is the front line? Is ANTO simply a relic of the successful past defeat of Soviet communism on which we are nervous to call a time for fear of creating a security void? For me that's certainly part of the argument. Getting rid of NATO seems an unnecessary leap in the dark. Without it I suspect that Europe's contribution to military solutions would be much weaker. The EU would certainly be hard-pressed to undertake those occasional exercises in which its super power ally does not wish to take part itself. In those instances the Europeans would not be able to tap into the assets that the US makes available to NATO as the organization's main military power. Europe without NATO would be tantamount to embracing unnecessarily a great deal of risk. In Europe I guess that we can still grumble old beards more quietly these days, but even a multi-lateralist administration still makes policy primarily on its own which it then asks us to support. Look at Afghanistan and Pakistan. That's partly our own fault. We have to confront the consequences of wishing to strut our staff on the world stage as a major player while not being prepared to pay the full price for that role. We can't grumble quite so justifiably about American leadership to be more or less unilateralist variety in security matters when we are not prepared to dig as deep into our pockets to pay for our military as Americans are. We need sometimes to see ourselves as many in the US see us. Monday morning quarterbacks the courage of whose convictions does not always stretch to paying for them. If we wish to be an effective partner of a large multi-lateralist American super-power what should Europe do? What is Washington entitled to expect of us? First, managing our own economic recovery through and beyond these turbulent days must be a primary objective. Here much depends on the domestic management of individual member states which will vary according to whether the economies concerned are getters or exporting creditors. But there are three issues that we'll need to be aware of collectively. Europe has normally been on the right side of arguments about free trade with the lamentable exception of agriculture. It's imperative that we avoid slithering into financial protectionism and economic nationalism in the Union or beyond. It would be a calamity to allow the disintegration of the single market which has been Europe's most significant achievement. G-20 commitments to free trade are being belied as the world bankers have shown by significant backsliding. That must stop and the EU should be at the vanguard of stopping it. Europe's longer term problem is two-fold. For me the most significant remarks of President Obama on the margins of the G-20 concerned his determination to end the days during which the US has had a voracious appetite for the goods and services that the rest of the world provides. If it is indeed the end of America's period as the world's spender and borrower of last resort, then we need to look elsewhere for the principal engines of world growth. The relationship between the surplus and deficit countries is going to change and that will not be a welcome message in some parts of Europe. Nor are we keen to face up to the results of our demographic challenge. Both the 20% decline in our population by mid-century and the ageing and reduction of our work force, if we are to raise our productivity

and our underlying growth rate, we shall need to make labor market and welfare reforms attitudes to social solidarity. It's true that we have an extraordinarily good quality of life, but as Tancredi says in Lampedusa's great novel "The Leopard", if we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change. We also need to invest more in research and development and in our badly underfunded universities. The danger is that without reform and change we will find ourselves with a falling population, a falling share of world output and trade and a declined influence and value as the super-power's principal partner in the world. Second, our principal road in foreign and security policy should be to continue to underpin stability on our continent and around the border of the EU. I talked earlier about part of the motivation for increasing the membership of EU. Enlargement has been our most successful foreign policy, promoting regime change peacefully and promoting reforms that have secured democracy, welfare capitalism and the rule of law. Sometimes we have allowed the political attractions of enlargement to run ahead of criteria that applicant country should be able to meet. That was true of Romania and Bulgaria where corruption and organized crime, especially in Bulgaria, continue to pose problems. But overall enlargement has been a huge success and its prospect has been at the heart of the political process that brought stability to the Balkans. It would be a huge error if we were to allow the momentum of this policy to slacken. Croatia is already in negotiation for full membership. Macedonia's candidacy is accepted, though the opening of negotiations is held up by an argument about the country's name in which both Greece and Macedonia have behaved with what fast minded observers would surely regard as extreme childishness. The other countries of South-East Europe are at various stages of pre-negotiation status, encompassed in a process called bureaucratically stabilization and association. There are two important considerations here. The EU must remain firmly committed to the perspective of membership for these countries. If they come to believe that the existing member states are not serious about this, the will to reform will weaken. Second, the EU must be tough but not unfair on the conditions of membership. Bosnia-Herzegovina for example must have a properly functioning national government. The high representative there should take tougher action against those politicians responsible for the present political paralysis, freezing their salaries, for instance, if necessary. Serbia must demonstrate its unshakable commitment to the international rule of law and stop its overt encouragement of separatism Kosovo, north of Mitrovitsa. Brussels should be able to convince Washington, alas the task seems to be getting more difficult, that the heavy lifting in the Balkans can be left to the EU. That will require rather more prolonged attention to what is going on in the region, than some member states have been prepared to offer recently. It's a besetting sin in foreign policy to get bored with a subject and to move on before the job is properly done. There is a lot more to do in South-East Europe. My biggest concern about enlargement concerns Turkey, a country accepted by Brussels as part of Europe and therefore as a potential EU member for over fifty years. During that period Turkey has successfully pursued reforms that have anchored its status as a modern, increasingly prosperous European democracy. The membership ambitions of Turkey have been supported by America with an occasional, indeed pretty regular, lack of sensitivity. The high point in crassness occurred during the build-up to the invasion of Iraq, when America's then Deputy Secretary of Defense and a previous giver of this lecture, part of an administration that championed Turkey's EU ambitions flew to Ankara to scold Turkish generals for not overriding the Parliament's clear refusal to allow Turkey to be used as an American base for the war. It cannot surely have passed him by that encouraging soldiers to overrule democratically elected politicians, was not one of Europe's so-called Copenhagen political criteria for membership. But we in Europe have behaved from time to time with almost equal insensitivity. The BBC's Europe editor Mark Mardell commented a couple of years ago, somewhat exaggerating the point, that the reforms demanded of Turkey were analogous to a pre-accession UK being told to apologize for its behavior to India, change the way of policing Northern Ireland and hand back Gibraltar. The question of Turkish

membership to EU is difficult, partly because we in Europe have increased the complexity ourselves. For example, we allowed a divided Cyprus to become a member of the EU, on the understanding that the Greek Cypriots would negotiate an agreement to end division with their Turkish neighbors on the UN auspices. Once in the EU, the Greek Cypriot government in effect resigned from the deal, even preventing a EU commissioner from coming to the island to explain its advantages. It is to me unthinkable that an issue of the importance of Turkish membership can be put in bulk by behavior like this. My own position has always been clear, I don't want to argue it at length here. Turkish membership to the EU would be hugely beneficial economically and politically to Europe. Turkey's economic potential with a young and dynamic work force could help power Europe's economy. Politically Turkish membership would give Europe far greater clout not only in its neighborhood, but outside the region. I believe that the issue is a defining one for Europe's future. If we were to reject Turkey at the end of negotiations in which every test had been met, we can write off being taken seriously as a significant global force. Turkey can make the process easier or more difficult. Major decisions to be taken in the next few months on reforms, on Cyprus and on Armenia will set the tone for several years ahead. Turkey clearly has to choose what kind of country it wants to be. To move forward or go back. I hope it will choose to continue on the road to becoming a more successful, more daring country, building on the successes of recent years. Turkey is a first division country which should play in the first division too. The EU and some of its members may seem from the Turkish perspective to be hypocritical, prejudiced, confused and inert. Turkey should avoid behaving in a similar way. I hope that Turkey will give its friends in Europe the arguments to help them win the battle for supporting Europe. Continuing with reform will help out frank opponents and that would also be good for Turkey. I don't imagine that Turkey underestimates the role that its EU process played in the a boom of the 2000s, with 7 years of growth. The idea that Turkey was moving towards EU-style rules and regulations gave a sense of security to investors and foreign investment flooded in. Turkey's neighbors are interested in a European, modernizing country. Investors from the Gulf are looking for the same safe environment for business that they could count on in EU capitals. On Cyprus Turkey has done well to seize the chances for a settlement as they have emerged in the last five years. The best outcome would be a full settlement resulting from the current talks. If that fails, Turkey and the EU should avoid allowing the EU convergence process to be blocked by the issue and should search for a way forward under the additional protocol to the Ankara agreement forcing the opening of ports and airports and the normalization of relations with Greek Cypriots. Challenging as that may be, last month's normalization agreement with Armenia was a hugely important step forward. Keeping the Armenian border closed does nothing to persuade Armenia to compromise on Nagorno-Karabakh, a point which EU member states should make persuasively to the Azerbaijan government. I am sure that Turkey recognizes that it has to convince voters in Europe's democracies that it's playing to the EU rules and it is a desirable friend, partner and member of the Union. It's more convincing when Turkey behaves like a EU member look out rather than as an outsider rattling the gates to get in. This is an argument that we can win. Outflanking populist politicians in Europe who use the issue of Turkish membership as a surrogate or whipping boy for their own domestic problems with immigration, economic dissatisfaction and cultural frictions. The question is too important for us to allow the negotiations for membership to run into a wall or to grind slowly to a halt in the sand. My other two geo-strategic priorities, which I will deal briefly in developing our partnership with the US, are both matters where Turkey too has an important role to play. Europe's greatest political failure in the last ten years has been our inability to put together a common and coherent position on Russia. European member states have cut bilateral deals with Russia on energy and Moscow has used them to advance its political agenda. Gazprom has been the principal agent in attempting to secure Russian sphere of influence around her borders and to increase European dependence on a not very reliable monopoly provider, especially of gas.

There are signs that the EU may be waking up to the danger, not least of dependence on a source that is both politicized and uncertain. Any serious policy to reduce European dependence on Russia requires the creation of an internal European energy market with linked up energy networks and the breaking down of energy monopolies. The European Commission has put forward perfectly sensible proposals to this end, but they proved to be excessively strong meat for some members, especially the proposals on unbundling. There are other ways of creating a more market-friendly energy sector that would enable Europe to deal more effectively with Russia, which needless to say, objects to any change. The other aim for European energy policy should be faster progress on what eurocrats called a Southern Energy Corridor, securing Caspian energy supplies for European consumers. The fall in the energy prices has taken some of the sting out of Russia's aggressive and very political use of energy but unless we act I am sure that the Gazprom tanks will be driving once again onto European lawns. We'd have a better relationship with Russia if we were able to restrain its ability to bully its neighbors. Finally, more complicated is the role we should as Europeans be playing in our Mediterranean neighborhood. We spend much time talking to one another and to our Mediterranean partners about Palestine and Israel. Cui bono? We have a big checkbook which may be useful if there is ever a deal. But since we played no useful role to speak of when the US was not involved in the Bush years in the search for peace, I can't for the life of me say see what useful role we could play now that you are back on the case. It's sad, but there it is. We even seem reluctant to make in public the rather obvious point that there will be no agreement without the involvement of Hamas, presumably in the first place through its support, a point apparently understood by Secretary Clinton, for a government of national unity. I am afraid that for some years Europe's policy on the Middle East was simply to have another meeting of the quartet. The quartet sans trois, as Amr Moussa called it. Elsewhere in the region we should surely be using the Barcelona Process now morphed into something pretty well identical, for the union of the Mediterranean to pursue the freedom agenda that President Bush was right to identify, whatever the hapless way in which it was pursued. The US and Europe talk democracy but connive at the Arab exception, worried that elections in Arab and Muslim states would replace autocrats with men in beards. But the longer we accept that the Muslim world is not fertile ground for civil society, pluralism and democracy, the more certain it is that the men in beards will become more extreme and eventually win elections by even larger majorities. Europe's partnership with Mediterranean countries is posited on a shared commitment to good governance and human rights. We should start to act on this. There is an old saying that you have to be careful in life, lest you get what you hoped and asked for. That has happened to Europe. We have the American president of our dreams, we can no longer define ourselves in counter distinction to President Bush. As I have said, he was so convenient for Europeans. A solution in a way to the puzzle of what we wanted to be on the world stage. We could say with conviction, we know where we are, we are not with him. But the time has passed when we could sigh wearily, if only there was a multi-lateralist in the White House we would be able to rally to the task of offering constructive burden sharing in coping with the world's problems. There is such a political leader now in Washington and while he cannot walk on water, he can clearly throw bridges across it. So how far will we Europeans be able to advance across the planks and what will be the result if we remained clamorous but nervous and divided on our side of the water? Perhaps next time he comes to call President Obama will need to step on one or two European toes which may of course inhibit the rush by Europe's leaders to be photographed standing next to him. Thank you.

